industrial fi rms. In that decade, the three most signifi cant labor statutes were enacted and two major Supreme Court opinions were issued that together established a framework for governing labor relations that persists to this day. This framework was based upon assumptions rooted in the employment relationship that prevailed during the New Deal period. It was a framework that was appropriate to long-term employment relationships in stable work environments, but it is becoming increasingly out of date.
A The three new deal labor statutes
In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which declared it to be the public policy of the United States to support workers' right to organize and engage in collective bargaining . The Act made it unlawful for federal courts to issue injunctions in most labor disputes. In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which gave workers an enforceable right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid and protection, to organize unions of their own choosing, and to engage in collective bargaining . The NLRA also established an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to enforce those rights. In 1937, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act, which established a federal minimum wage and set maximum hours for employment . These three statutes, taken together, established a two-tiered system in which labor and management were encouraged to bargain to establish the terms of the employment relationship, while, at the same time, individual employees not covered by collective bargaining were guaranteed certain minimal employment terms.
In the same decade, the Supreme Court decided two cases that greatly expanded the power of the federal government to regulate private employment. In 1937 , in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937 , the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for a state to enact legislation setting minimum wages for women's labor. In so holding, the Court overturned a previous decision, Atkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) , which held that a state maximum hour law was an unconstitutional infringement on the right of freedom of contract and hence a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court justifi ed its reversal in West Coast Hotel by declaring that there is a public interest in ensuring an adequate level of wages for working people. The West Coast Hotel decision opened the door for state and federal governments to enact a host of statutes regulating the terms of the employment contract.
Two years later, in 1937, the Supreme Court held, in Jones and Laughlin v. NLRB (1937) , that the NLRA was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. In so holding, the Court rejected previous interpretations of the Commerce Clause that had placed severe limits on Congressional power to legislate regarding the private sector. The Jones and Laughlin decision signifi ed a monumental shift in the power of the federal government in all fi elds of regulation. The legislative and judicial developments of the 1930s provided the legal infrastructure for the two-tiered labor law regime of the postwar era -legal support for collective bargaining and mandated minimum terms of employment. While there have been many developments in the interpretation of the NLRA, and many new employment protections enacted by both national and state legislatures, this basic structure has survived to this day. 1 
B The operation of the collective bargaining laws
The labor laws of the 1930s use industrial era labor relations as the template for the employment relationship. They assume that workers are employed in stable jobs by corporations that value long-term attachment between the corporation and the worker, and that workers are employed in narrowly defi ned jobs with pre-determined lines of promotional opportunities that build upon the fi rm-specifi c skills acquired in their current positions. Some of the respects in which the labor laws were tailored to the industrial era workplace are discussed below.
(i) The concept of the bargaining unit
Under the NLRA, collective bargaining is organized around the concept of a 'bargaining unit'. If there is a suffi cient showing of interest by workers in a particular workplace, the NLRB determines the 'appropriate unit' and conducts an election among employees working in the unit to determine whether a majority favor the union (29 USC 159(b) ). If the union wins the election, the union is certifi ed and becomes the exclusive representative of the unit for purposes of collective bargaining (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 1969) . Once certifi ed, the employer and the union have a duty to bargain for a collective agreement that will govern the terms and conditions of employment for all workers in the unit, regardless of whether the employees are union members or not (Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 1944) . Any contract concluded between the union and the employer applies to all jobs in the unit. The terms and benefi ts apply to the job -they do not follow the worker to other jobs when they leave the unit. At the same time, the employees in the unit lose their right to take collective action apart from their certifi ed 1 For an overview of labor law in the United States, see generally, Stone (2000) . 2 For more detail on the ways in which labor laws assume an internal labor market arrangement of jobs, see Stone (2004 representative (Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization 1975) , and the union has a duty to represent fairly all employees in the unit -those that support the union and those that do not (Vaca v. Sipes 1967; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 1944) . The bargaining unit is thus an integral part of the statutory scheme of the NLRA. The agency that administers the Act, the NLRB, determines on a case-by-case basis what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. The Board does so by attempting to defi ne units of employees who share a 'community of interest'. Some of the factors the Board uses to determine whether there is a community of interest are: similarity in kinds of work performed, similarity in compensation, types of training and skills required, integration of job functions, and commonality of supervision (NLRB v. Action Auto. 1985; NLRB v. Purnell's Pride, Inc. 1980; Getman et. al. 1999) . Under the community of interest test, bargaining units tend to have static job defi nitions and clear department boundaries. The community of interest test assumes a functionally delineated workplace in which work tasks are continuous and well defi ned. In addition, the NLRB has a preference for worksite-specifi c bargaining units and has adopted a presumption in favor of single facility units (Charrette Drafting Supplies Co. 1985; Haag Drug Co. 1968; Metropolitian Life Insurance Co. 1966; Dixie Belle Mills, Inc. 1962; Wial 1993 ). Yet, much of today's work involves networks across multiple establishments or multi-employer tasks, defying traditional bargaining unit defi nitions. Thus the NLRB's approach to bargaining unit determination is in tension with cross-utilization and the blurring of boundaries typical of work practices today (Colvin 1998) .
The bargaining unit focus of the NLRA also means that terms and conditions negotiated by labor and management apply to the jobs in the unit rather than to the individuals who hold the jobs. As individual workers move between departments, units, or fi rms, their labor contracts do not follow them. Yet, today individuals experience considerable movement in their work lives, both within fi rms, between fi rms, and in and out of the labor market. As a result, in today's world of frequent movement, union gains are increasingly ephemeral from the individual's point of view.
(ii) Secondary boycott prohibitions Another feature of the NLRA that assumes the existence of bounded job defi nitions and internal labor markets is the prohibition on secondary boycotts. For a hundred years, courts have been hostile to eff orts by unions to exercise economic pressure against entities that are not involved in an immediate dispute (Plant v. Woods 1900; Bowen v. Matheson 1867; Lowe v. Lawlor 1908; Frankfurter and Greene 1931) . Congress has visited the issue of secondary boycotts repeatedly. In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act, (Public Law No. 106-274, codifi ed in scattered sections of 15 USC) which purported to legalize peaceful secondary pressure. However, in 1921 , in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (1921 , the Supreme Court gave the Clayton Act an extremely restrictive interpretation that eff ectively nullifi ed its labor-protective provisions. Subsequent pressure by organized labor and progressives induced Congress to enact the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 (Public Law No. 106-274, codifi ed at 29 USC 101-15 (1994) ), in which Congress again attempted to legalize peaceful secondary conduct by unions. The NorrisLaGuardia Act was upheld and interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court in the United States v. Hutchenson (1941) , but the legality of secondary conduct remained controversial. In 1947, Congress enacted section 8(b)(4) in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, which rendered secondary boycotts unlawful under the NRLA (see 29 USC 158(b)(4)). The scope of section 8(b)(4) and the larger issue of the lawfulness of peaceful secondary conduct remain controversial issues to this day.
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The labor law's ban on secondary activity assumes that union economic pressure and collective bargaining should take place within a discrete economic unit -the bargaining unit -and should be confi ned to the immediate parties in a bounded arena of confl ict. Within the unit, economic pressure is seen as potentially eff ective, yet comfortably containable. The eff ort to limit economic warfare to 'primary' participants assumes that the unionized workplace has static borders and that disputes within the entity between the fi rm and its workers aff ect only those immediate and identifi able parties.
Despite its goal of limiting the scope of economic confl ict, secondary boycott law has never been able to formulate a precise principled distinction between who is an insider and who is an outsider to a labor dispute (NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehouse Men, Local 760 1964; Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB 1961; Lesnick 1965) . In today's network production, the assumption that there can be discrete, bounded confl ict with clear insiders and outsiders is becoming less plausible than ever. Rather, unions are fi nding with increased frequency that eff orts to bring economic pressure to bear transverses traditional bargaining unit and corporate boundaries. As they seek to apply pressure on suppliers, joint venturers, co-employers, network partners, and subsidiaries, they are fi nding that the secondary boycott laws are a 3 Courts continue to enjoin secondary activity in disregard of specifi c statutory directives and precedent to the contrary. See, for example, Burlington NRR Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 US 429, 437-40 (1987) (criticizing lower courts for enjoining secondary conduct by railroad workers who were not subject to the NLRA's secondary boycott prohibitions). serious hindrance (Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Association 1992; Carpenter's Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens 1984 D'Amico v. Painters & Allied Trades District Council No. 51 1985) .
(iii) The defi nition of employee and employer The NLRA only provides protections for those individuals who fall within the statute's defi nition of an 'employee'. Individuals who work for multiple employers or the wrong kind of employer can easily fall outside the protection of the statute. Agricultural laborers, domestic workers, supervisors, and independent contractors are explicitly excluded from the Act, as are government employees and employees covered by the Railway Labor Act (29 USC 152(2) and (3)). There are additional NLRB-made exclusions for managerial and confi dential employees (NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. 1981; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 1974; In re Ford Motor Co. 1946) . Furthermore, employees who have some supervisory authority over others, or who have managerial decisions delegated to them, are excluded from coverage (NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. 1994; NLRB v. Yeshiva University 1980) . In today's workplace, in which hierarchies have been fl attened and decision-making authority has been delegated downward, the supervisory and managerial exclusions deprive many low-level employees of the protections of the Act (NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care 2001) .
The exclusion for independent contractors has become particularly problematic. Because the test for independent contractor status is broad, many who are dependent on a particular employer for their livelihood are nonetheless classifi ed as independent contractors and deprived of all labor law protections (Stone 2006b ). Increasingly, employers attempt to reclassify employees and to vary their employment practices so as to transform their former 'employees' into 'independent contractors' (Brustein 2005; Ball 2003; Graditor 2003) . Many low-paid employees such as janitors, truck loaders, typists, and building cleaners have been redefi ned as independent contractors even when they are retained by large companies to work on a regular basis.
The independent contractor exclusion also eliminates coverage for many part-time and short-term temporary workers. 4 Such workers often work for more than one employer at a time, but are dependent upon and subject 4 In the 1947 amendment to section 2(2) of the NLRA (29 USC 152(2)), Congress rejected an 'economic reality' test in favor of a common law test for determining independent contractor status. However, the Board and courts of appeal have often diff ered as to what that test requires.
to the supervision of each employer for the time they are at work. Yet, when a worker has multiple employers, each employer will often claim that the worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee. Courts often accept the employer's own defi nition of a temporary worker's status, thereby excluding a fast-growing portion of the workforce from unionization altogether (Clark v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 1997; Abraham v. Exxon Corp. 1996; Vizcaino v. United States District Court 1999) .
(iv) The act's de facto exclusion of temporary workers One area in which the bargaining unit focus of the NLRA has been particularly out of step with labor market reality concerns the Act's treatment of long-term temporary employees. Indeed, the evolving law of temporary workers illustrates the diffi culty of applying static notions of bargaining units to the complex employment relationships that arise with today's peripatetic workforce.
Since the 1980s, temporary employment has been the fastest growing portion of the labor market. According to the US Department of Labor, between 1982 and , the number of jobs in the temporary help industry grew 577 percent, compared to a 41 percent increase in jobs in the labor force generally (GAO 2000, p. 16) . In 1999, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that nearly 2 million employees worked for temporary-help agencies or contract labor provider fi rms (BLS 1999) . Temporary employees who work for staffi ng agencies are often given long-term placement at particular user fi rms. There, the user fi rm supervises the work of the temp on a day-to-day basis, and the temp works alongside the fi rm's regular employees, with the same skills, duties, and job classifi cations. In this triangulated employment relationship, the NLRB has considered both the temporary agency and the user fi rm to be joint employers of the temporary employee.
In 1990, the NLRB ruled that long-term temporary employees could not be included in a bargaining unit with a user-employer's regular employees unless both the provider-agency employer and the user-employer consented (Lee Hospital 1990). Thereafter, the Board refused to consider any unit that combined temporary and regular employees, absent consent of both employers (International Transfer of Fla 1991) . Because it is highly unusual for an employer to consent to its employees forming a union, the dual consent requirement made it virtually impossible for temporary workers to unionize.
In 2000, the NLRB reversed its former position and held that regular employees and temporary employees could be in the same bargaining unit so long as they shared a community of interest (Sturgis & Textile Processors, 331 NLRB 1298 , 165 LRRM (BNA) 1017 (2000 ). The Board also stated that temporary employees could unionize in a bargaining unit of all the employees of a single temporary work agency. As a result, the NLRB began to permit temporary employees to be included in bargaining units that are comprised of temporary and regular employees of a single employer, or that are comprised of all employees of a single temporary agency. This ruling greatly expanded the possibilities for temporary workers to claim the protection of the labor law. However, in 2004 the NLRB again reversed itself in the case of Oakwood Care Center and N & W Agency, and reinstated the dual consent requirement for temporary worker organizing eff orts (176 LRRM (BNA) 1033 (2004)). As a result, temporary workers are not able to organize in units with the permanent workers they work alongside. Rather, if they want to unionize, they must do so together with the other workers employed by their temporary agency. Yet agency temporary workers are dispersed and have little contact with each other. Thus, as a practical matter, temporary workers lack representation or a collective voice under the labor law.
C Statutory protections for individual employees
In addition to the laws to promote collective bargaining, Congress in the New Deal period enacted minimal employment standards for individual employees not covered by collective bargaining. Federal and state employment laws provided a safety net and set a fl oor of benefi ts for those workers who remain outside the bilateral collective bargaining system. In 1935 Congress enacted the Social Security Act which provided old-age assistance and disability insurance (Social Security Act of 1935). It also had provisions for unemployment compensation for workers who lost their jobs through no fault of their own. In 1938, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) which established a federal minimum wage and set maximum hours for employment (Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938).
Over the past 30 years, the employment laws have expanded in number and scope as the extent of the collective bargaining system has contracted. In the 1970s, individual employment protections were expanded by national legislation to provide occupational safety and health protection (Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970), pension insurance (Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974), expanded protection against discrimination for government employees (Rehabilitation Act of 1973) and pregnant women (Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978), and protection for federal employee whistleblowers who report employer wrongdoing (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). In the 1980s, Congress enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi cation Act (WARN) requiring employers to give their employees advance notice of plant closings and mass layoff s (Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi cation Act (WARN) of 1988), and the Employee Polygraph Act (Employee Polygraph Act of 1988) to provide protection for worker privacy interests. In the same period, numerous states enacted legislation to protect the job security, privacy, dignity, and other concerns of employees. Thus as union density has declined in the private sector, statutory protections have become the main source of worker rights. Yet most of those statutory protections are only available to workers who have an ongoing relationship with a specifi c employer.
In addition to the legislative developments described above, in the 1980s some state courts began to imply exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, thereby giving workers in those states judicial protection against unfair dismissal. The exceptions were not uniform -some states recognized a tort of unjust dismissal, some imposed implied terms of good faith and fair dealing on employment contracts, and some expanded the situations in which courts would enforce implied contracts for job security. Some courts also became more receptive to the application of conventional torts to workplace harms. Thus, for example, some courts permitted workers to recover for mistreatment under theories of the tort of intentional infl iction of emotional distress or defamation in job references. Despite these exceptions, however, the bulk of American nonunion workers remained subject to the at-will doctrine and basically unprotected for their job-related grievances.
Even with the expansion of individual worker statutory and judge-made rights, in many important respects the employment laws remain tailored to the industrial era workplace and are thus less eff ective in the workplace of today. For example, the New Deal social security and unemployment insurance programs were not universal in their coverage. Rather, they tied crucial social insurance protections to employment, thereby reinforcing the bond between the employee and the fi rm. Furthermore, they did not provide mandatory and universal health insurance. Thus workers were left to obtain health insurance from individual employers, usually as a product of labor-management negotiations.
Other types of employment law protections also assume an employment relationship and hence are not available to persons designated 'independent contractors'. Unlike Europe and Canada, in the United States there have not been legislative eff orts to create an intermediate category between 'employee' and 'independent contractor' that would give atypical workers some of the employment protections available for standard workers. independent contractor -where the former gets a variety of employment law protections and the latter gets none. Independent contractors are not covered by minimum wage, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, occupational safety and health laws, collective bargaining laws, social security disability, anti-discrimination laws, or any of the other employment protections discussed above (Stone 2006b; Barton 2002) .
2 The demise of the new deal system and the state of labor and employment law today Because the labor and employment laws were tailored to the job structures of the industrial era of the 20th century, they have become obsolete as internal labor markets have declined in importance and new ideas about how to organize work have generated new work practices that are proliferating throughout American enterprises. Job security in the private sector, in the form of long-term attachment between a worker and a single fi rm for the duration of the worker's career, is rapidly declining.
6 Today, workers expect to change jobs frequently and employers engage in regular churning of their workplace, combining layoff s with new hiring as production demands and skill requirements shift. In addition, there has been an explosion in the use of atypical workers such as temporary workers, on-call workers, leased workers, and independent contractors. Furthermore, 'regular' full-time employment no longer carries the presumption of a long-term attachment between an employee and a single fi rm with orderly promotion patterns and upwardly rising wage patterns. No longer is employment centered on a single, primary employer. Instead, employees now expect to change jobs frequently. At the same time, fi rms now expect a regular amount of churning in their workforces. They encourage employees to manage their own careers and not to expect career-long job security.
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A new employment relationship is emerging to replace the industrial era internal labor markets. Today's world of specialty production and knowledge work has spurred the development of new job structures, the 6 According to the United States Department of Labor's current Population Survey, job tenure for men between 55 and 65, measured as the average time with a given employer, declined from 15.3 to 10.2 years between 1883 and 2002. For men between 45 and 54, it declined from 12.8 to 9.1; for men between 35 and 44, it declined from 7.3 to 5.1 (BLS News Releases, Employee Tenure in 2002 (9/25/02)). Several economists who have analyzed this and other data sources have concluded that since 1980 there has been a signifi cant decline in job tenure. See Jaeger and Stevens (1999) and Valletta (1999) (citing numerous studies). job structures of the 'digital era'. In the new digital era, theoretical and experimental approaches, such as total quality management (TQM), competency-based organizations, and high performance work practice programs, are transforming business practices. The advocates of the competency-based organization emphasize skill development by insisting that employees be paid for the skills they have, rather than according to lock-step job evaluation formulas (Lawler 1992) . Skill-based pay, they claim, will give employees an incentive to acquire new skills and also make it incumbent upon employers to provide training and career development opportunities (Lawler 1992; Stone 2001) . Advocates of TQM, meanwhile, counsel fi rms to involve every employee, at every level, in continuous product and service improvement. Some of the specifi c recommendations of TQM are to provide continuous training and opportunities for individual improvement, and to give workers direct contact with customers, external suppliers, and others who do business with the fi rm (Rosett and Rosett 1999; Anschutz 1995) .
Despite diff erences in emphasis, the various approaches that comprise the new employment relationship share several common features (Roehling et al. 1998) . A defi ning characteristic of the new employment relationship is that employees do not have long-term job security with a particular employer. Employees have episodic jobs, sometimes as regular employees, sometimes as temporary workers, and sometimes as independent contractors. Employment relationships are complex, without any one-size-fi ts-all model of what it means to be a worker.
When employees are with a fi rm in an employment relationship, they are given implicit understandings that provide a substitute for the job security of the past. Many employers explicitly or implicitly promise to give employees not job security, but 'employability security' -that is, opportunities to develop their human capital so they can prosper in the external labor market (Kanter 2001) .
Another feature of the new employment relationship is that it places emphasis on the worker's intellectual and cognitive contribution to the fi rm. Unlike scientifi c management, which attempted to diminish or eliminate the role of workers' knowledge in the production process, today's management theories attempt to increase employee knowledge and harness their knowledge on behalf of the fi rm (Stewart 1997; Davenport 1999) .
The new employment relationship also involves compensation systems that peg salaries and wages to market rates rather than internal institutional factors. The emphasis is on off ering employees diff erential pay to refl ect diff erential talents and contributions (Kanter 1997) .
As part of the new employment relationship, fi rms now also provide employees with opportunities to interact with a fi rm's customers, suppliers and even competitors.
8 Regular employee contact with the fi rm's constituents is touted as a way to get employees to be familiar with and focused on the fi rm's competitive needs, and at the same time to raise the employees' social capital so that they can fi nd jobs elsewhere.
The new relationship also involves a fl attening of hierarchy, the elimination of status-linked perks (Klein 1994) , and the use of company-specifi c grievance mechanisms (Greenberg 1996; Colquitt et al. 2001) .
While the new employment relationship does not depend upon long-term employment, attachment or mutual loyalty between the employee and the fi rm, it also does not dispense with the need for engaged and committed employees. Indeed, fi rms today believe that they need the active engagement of their employees more than ever before. They want not merely predictable and excellent role performance, but what has been described as 'spontaneous and innovative activity that goes beyond role requirements' (Deckop et al. 1999) . They want employees to commit their imagination, energies, and intelligence on behalf of their fi rm.
Today's valuation of employees' cognitive contribution stands in direct contrast to the scientifi c management approach. Under scientifi c management, workers were not expected to gain or use knowledge in their jobs. Knowledge was a monopoly tightly held by management. Today, fi rms believe that they can acquire a competitive advantage by eliciting and harnessing the knowledge of their employees. According to Fortune magazine editor, Thomas Stewart, 'Information and knowledge are the thermonuclear competitive weapons of our time' (Stewart 1997) .
The emerging employment relationship has two diametrically opposed consequences. On the one hand, it creates a more interesting work environment and off ers workers more autonomy and freedom than did the industrial era job structures. Yet on the other hand, for many it creates uncertainty, shifts risk, and fosters vulnerability. Some of the groups that are disadvantaged in the new work regime are easily identifi ed. For example, older workers caught in the transition are heavy losers. Having been led to expect a good job and a secure future, they have instead discovered that their expectations were chimeral. 9 Another group that has not fared well is the low-skilled -those who have neither the necessary 8 For example, one of the most touted practices of Total Quality Management is that management should seek to create conditions whereby every worker, at least from time to time, sees and talks with real customers, with actual users of the company's products or service (Anschutz 1995). 9 For example, a case study of white-collar workers laid off at IBM and Link Aerospace in Binghamton, New York, two companies known for their paternalistic long-term employment relationships, concluded that downsizing and displacement training nor the ability to reinvent themselves, retool, and adapt to new labor market demands. A third group is the risk-averse -those who were comfortable in internal labor markets and lack the desire or initiative to seek out opportunities, to network, and to build their own careers.
In addition to the older, the unskilled, and the risk-averse, all workers now face heightened risks at certain times in their working lives. Given the churning and constant changes that characterize the new workplace, all face a high likelihood that their working lives will be peppered by occasional periods of unemployment. Therefore every worker requires a reliable safety net to ease the transitions and cushion the fall when they are left behind by the boundaryless workplace.
Labor law and employment protection in the future
The foregoing historical perspective returns us to the question, what will the labor and employment law look like in the future? In the past, labor and employment laws were enacted as the result of pressure from organized labor and social reformers to ameliorate the vulnerabilities and injustices that occur in the operation of the labor market. The labor and employment laws in eff ect today share that origin. The problem for the future is that the labor and employment laws no longer provide redress for the most pressing problems of workers. The changing nature of work has caused new problems to arise in the operation of the labor market, problems that call for new kinds of regulatory interventions. Today workers move frequently between fi rms and within fi rms, so bargaining-unit-based unionism gives little protection. And the employment laws do not give adequate protection to individuals who move in and out of the labor market, or who do not have a typical relationship with a single employer.
There are two possible scenarios for the future of labor law. One scenario is that labor law will continue to atrophy, unions will continue to decline, and individual employee rights will be chipped away through the combined processes of narrowing judicial construction of existing rights, the development of a robust waiver doctrine whereby employees will have rights on paper but not in practice, pressures from globalization for lower labor standards, and a slow erosion of specifi c monetary standards through infl ation. This scenario is a likely one given the declining power of unions at the legislative level that results from labor's declining numerical strength. Union political power is necessary to pressure politicians to maintain employment standards at current levels or raise them higher. In change the expectations about the relationships among workers and between employers and workers (Koeber 2002). this fi rst scenario, workers' rights will decline in all the respects just mentioned, and we will see a return to the laissez-faire labor regulation of the pre-Wagner Act era.
The other scenario is that labor laws will evolve in a way that represents a marked break with the present in order to address the needs and concerns of individuals in the new workplace. I predict that changes will come in some or all of these respects: a partial collapse of the distinction between labor law and • employment-law; an expanded focus on the legislative front rather than on collective • bargaining to set employment conditions; an expansion of collective bargaining to new groups, such as inde-
• pendent contractors, atypical workers, immigrants, unemployed workers, and geographically defi ned groups; a broadening of the fi eld of labor and employment law to include • all issues of concern to working people, such as health care policy, training and education, welfare, intellectual property protection, pensions and social security, housing policy, and other areas of social law; the creation of a new type of social safety net to focus on the problem
• of transitions and gaps in people's labor market experiences.
In the remainder of this chapter, I sketch some aspects of each of these items.
A Collapsing the distinction between labor and employment law
As stated above, the US system of employment regulation has maintained a distinction between collective bargaining rights for unionized workers and individual employment rights for other workers. Though this distinction sounds fi xed in theory, there has in fact always been a permeable boundary between these bodies of regulation. The labor law section 301 preemption doctrine serves as the primary traffi c cop that directs individuals with work-related disputes to one body of law or the other. However, the preemption doctrine itself has been an evolving and changing set of rules, so that some individual rights can be vindicated by individuals who have union contracts, and some cannot (Stone 1992) . The general principle of section 301 preemption, subject to some exceptions, is that if vindication of an individual employment right requires a court to interpret a collective bargaining agreement, the action is preempted and left to be decided in Most of these claims were misclassifi cation cases in which workers sought unpaid overtime (Miller 2007) .
Through consolidation of claims, employment law collective actions can result in sizeable damage awards. For example, in recent wage and hour suits in California alone, the Coca-Cola Bottling Company settled a case for $20.2 million, Bank of America settled for $22 million, and Rite Aid Corp. settled for $25 million (Hechler 2001) . In 2002, United Parcel Service agreed to pay $18 million to settle a similar suit on behalf of misclassifi ed supervisors (Ogletree et al. 2002) . The same year, Starbucks Corp. also paid $18 million private arbitration. For a detailed discussion of how the preemption doctrine operates to mediate the boundary between labor law and employment law and how the doctrine has changed over time, see Stone (1992) .
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Collective actions under the FLSA are provided for at 29 USC section 216. They do not have the same stringent requirements for numerosity and typicality that are imposed by rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class actions, so it is easier under the FLSA for a collective action to be maintained. to settle two class action suits on behalf of current and former managers and assistant managers in California who claimed that they had been misclassifi ed as 'exempt' employees and thereby denied overtime compensation.
Collective employment litigation, whether technically brought as 'class actions' or FLSA 'collective actions', are an expanding form of collective action in an era of declining union activity. While such actions do not create the experience of solidarity and collective empowerment that unionization eff orts and strikes do, they share some features with other conventional forms of collective action. They refl ect a shared sense of work-related wrong and they identify a group of workers -the class -as having a shared interest in correcting these wrongs. They also operate through representatives, the named plaintiff s and the class counsel, who speak to management for the workers and, at least in theory, represent the workers' interests. Collective employment actions are greatly feared by management because, apart from their potential fi nancial exposure, the suits are potentially poisonous to general workplace morale because they are ongoing disputes involving incumbent disgruntled employees.
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Class actions also have some obvious and signifi cant diff erences with conventional unionization eff orts. First, they do not involve the type of mobilization that typically occurs in a union drive. Furthermore, they do not aim to form lasting organizations nor do they off er the prospects of an ongoing bargaining relationship between workers and an employer over the whole range of issues involved in the employment relationship. They may take a long time to run their course, but essentially they are oneshot, single issue challenges to a company's employment practices. And they also do not generally foster the type of bonds of solidarity on which conventional unionism relies.
14 Finally, they seek to vindicate pre-existing statutory rights, not to defi ne the normative rules that shall govern the workplace. That is, unlike collective bargaining, they are not an exercise in labor-management self-regulation.
It is interesting to note that the features of collective employment actions that distinguish them from collective bargaining parallel the broad changes in the workforce. In collective litigation, relatively atomistic employees come together to fi ght on one issue. Some class members may not be employed by the defendant at the time of the lawsuit, and the members of the class often have never met each other. Once the litigation is over, any 13 This point was made to me in conversation by the head of employment litigation for one offi ce of Jackson, Lewis law fi rm, the largest employer-side employment law fi rm in the United States.
bonds of solidarity dissolve. This is similar to the mobile, self-contained knowledge worker that is the paradigm of today's worker. Hence it is possible that ex post single issue workplace governance is the form that collective action will increasingly take in the future.
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Despite the diff erences between collective employment litigation and collective bargaining, as unions decline collective litigation has become an important venue for the protection of employment rights. Their profusion suggests that this may be an important form of employee collective action for the future. If that is the case, then the specifi c legal requirements of maintaining a collective legal action -whether a class action or a FLSA collective action -will come under increased scrutiny. For example, in some employment discrimination litigation, courts have begun to question the application of rule 23(b)'s commonality and typicality requirements to workplaces in which management authority is diff use and delegated to lower-level supervisors. 16 This issue is posed presently in the behemoth employment discrimination case, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, involving 1.5 million present and former Wal-Mart employees. 17 There are similar debates about the requirement in FLSA collective actions that class members 'opt in' rather than 'opt out' as is permitted under rule 23 (see, for example, Ruckelshaus 2008; Lampe and Rossman 2005) . As employment class actions continue to proliferate, these procedural requirements will take on added signifi cance.
Another feature of these new types of collective actions is the involvement of unions. More and more, unions are fi nancing and otherwise assisting unorganized workers in mounting employment class actions. For example, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union has been actively involved in wage and hour suits against Albertson's grocery chain, Tyson Foods, Perdue Farms, and the Nordstrom retail chain (Hechler 2001) . The Writers' Guild sponsored several wage and hour class action lawsuits against television reality shows, even though the employees involved were not represented by the union (Sharp v. Next LASC Case No. BC 338746) . Some have argued that by assisting these types of actions, unions can gain a foothold in unorganized workplaces that could lead to greater organizing success down the road. While there is no evidence to date that this has occurred, it remains a hopeful prospect for a labor movement that is experiencing hemorrhaging losses. Before we can conclude that collective employment actions are either a substitute for actual unionization or a foot-in-the-door method to revitalize the union movement, it is necessary to look at some legal issues that are waiting in the wings. One issue that has arisen is whether a union, by giving unorganized workers fi nancial assistance in the form of legal representation in employment litigation, is giving an unlawful benefi t to improperly infl uence workers' choice whether or not to unionize. Some court decisions have held that when a union fi nances employment litigation, it is an unlawful payment of benefi ts and hence grounds to set aside a union election.
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Another issue that might arise is whether a union that participates in the negotiation of a settlement of an employment class comprised of unorganized workers is acting in a representative capacity without having attained majority status. In such a case, its actions would also violate the statute. If union involvement in employment class actions is to be an important tactic in the future of the union movement, the labor law will need to address these issues.
B Shifting from collective bargaining to legislation to set employment conditions As explained above, the New Deal system involved setting the core conditions of the employment contract by bargaining, whether collectively or individually, between the worker and the employer. The individual employment standards were set at a minimal level. For example, the minimum wage is so low that a worker working full time at minimum wage would not receive the poverty level wage for a family of four. The legislation anticipates that workers with suffi cient bargaining power will bargain for wages above the set minimum. Similarly, state workers' compensation laws vary as to their adequacy, but none of them provides full income replacement for workers injured on the job.
In recent years, as unions have declined, more statutory employment rights have been created that are applicable to all workers, whether unionized or not. In addition, as unions decline, the nature of legislated individual employment rights has shifted from a fl oor to a baseline. That is, the more recent employment standards are not designed to set bare minima, but to set an adequate baseline level of protection. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act imposes a 'general duty on employers to provide each worker a work environment that is free from identifi ed hazards'. Similarly, workplace privacy protections and employment discrimination legislation is designed to ensure individuals a workplace that is free of discrimination and respectful of employee privacy. This is not to say that these and other employment rights are set at an optimal or even a truly adequate level. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act mandates a minimal period of leave for child-bearing, but does not mandate pay replacement for the period of the leave. But unlike the original New Deal employment rights, the more recent statutory rights are intended to apply to a majority of workers, not merely those at the margins of subsistence.
This change in the nature of employment rights and the increase in rights for all employees represents a shift in the locus of employment regulation away from collective bargaining and toward the state. In a similar fashion, some legislatures and state courts have fashioned exceptions to the at-will rule -albeit generally narrow exceptions -which have come to supplant the just cause protection that previously were only found in union contracts. Some exceptions take the form of non-retaliation protection in employment law statutes, and some take the form of judicially created common law doctrines such as the tort of unfair dismissal. This is not to suggest that union contracts no longer off er job security protection nor that state and federal exceptions are ample or widespread, but rather that as unions decline, courts and legislatures have to some extent stepped in.
The shift from collective bargaining to legislation does not necessarily signal the end of unionism, but rather foreshadows a change in union strategy and tactics. Unions may shift their focus from exerting employer-specifi c pressure to exerting pressure in the political arena at the federal, state and local levels. This would represent a signifi cant turn from the US labor movement's traditional position dating back to Sam Gompers in the 1890s, that union pressure was most eff ective in the economic realm rather than in the political realm. As discussed above, employer-centered union pressures are rendered less eff ective than they were in the past because employees have little attachment to either a specifi c employer or a particular craft group.
In terms of the future of employment law, we can expect not only more employment laws, but also more controversy about them. We can expect an increased role of labor in politics and with it, increased litigation about union political expenditures. There is a storm of litigation about the Beck rules concerning which fees must be paid by individuals who are in unionized bargaining units but have chosen not to be members. This issue and others resulting from unions' involvement in politics will increase in their urgency (Masters et al. forthcoming; Masters and Jones 1999) .
C Expanding collective bargaining to new groups, particularly geographically defi ned groups
There is evidence that employees feel they need unions, but not necessarily the unions that now exist (Freeman and Rogers 1984) . Given the decline of worker-fi rm attachment, workers need organizations that further their joint interests but that are not pegged to a particular employer. Because workers move frequently within and between fi rms throughout their working lives, there needs to be a mechanism for workers to deploy their collective power to negotiate conditions across employers.
At the present time, some new types of organizations are emerging that attempt to engage in bargaining with multiple employers in diff erent industries or that utilize workers with diff ering skills. For example, in many cities, unions have worked with community groups to enact living wage ordinances to improve labor standards for low-wage public sector employees (Stone 2006a) . Presently there are city-wide living wage ordinances in Baltimore, Los Angeles, and other places as a result of area-wide political pressures by community and labor groups. Although such ordinances are limited to public sector employees, they suggest a new form of bargaining for workers across industries on a locality-wide basis. We could foresee city ordinances that set industrial safety codes, mandate paid family leave, require employers to provide health insurance, and address other issues that are part of the shared needs of all working people in the area.
In a similar vein, in Los Angeles, San Antonio, and some other cities, unions and community groups have worked together to negotiate community benefi t agreements with city authorities and private investors to provide job creation, job training, aff ordable housing, social services, public parks, and other community improvements in exchange for support for development projects. 19 There have also been multiple-employer organizing eff orts
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For a detailed account of the union-community alliances and the negotiation of a community benefi ts agreement in Los Angeles, see Cummings (2006) . On similar eff orts undertaken by the Industrial Areas Foundation in San Antonio and other cities in Texas, see Paul Osterman (2002) . of immigrant workers within particular sectors (Milkman 2006) . In many cities, worker centers have developed to inform low wage workers, often immigrants, of their legal rights (Fine 2006) .
The present labor law does not easily accommodate area-wide multiemployer, multi-sector bargaining, particularly when it involves unioncommunity partnerships on one side, and multiple employers and city agencies on the other. However, organizations that engage in such eff orts could provide important benefi ts for workers in today's labor market. Although workers change jobs more than in the past, they usually fi nd new jobs in the same geographic area as their previous jobs. Hence it would be desirable for the labor law to facilitate area-wide bargaining on such issues as minimum pay levels, health and pension benefi ts, leave policies, safety standards, job training programs, job transfer rights, and employment benefi ts at the local and/or regional level. To do so, the labor law would have to expand the present notion of bargaining units, and devise another mechanism for determining legally sanctioned bargaining rights. Proposals for geographic unions such as put forward by Charles Heckscher, Raymond Miles, and this author can serve as a starting point (Heckscher 1988; Miles 1989; Stone 2004) .
One objection to these initiatives is that the more that unions exert pressure on corporations at the local level, the more temptation there will be for corporations to relocate to avoid union demands. This is the well-known danger of the race to the bottom, and it refl ects the fact that capital is generally more mobile than people. Absent some particular reason for remaining in a particular locale, corporations will tend to move to locations that have the lowest labor costs (Stone 1995; .
While corporations often race to the bottom or at least away from the top, there are circumstances in which corporations do not move to the lowest cost location. Sometimes corporations want to take advantage of a specifi cally trained labor force, and sometimes they want to be near particular markets or raw materials (Stone 1999) . In today's world, often corporations want to be near others that produce in their fi eld to take advantage of 'agglomeration economies'.
In the 1980s, economists began to study the eff ect of agglomeration on economic growth. They found that fi rms producing certain types of goods and services were likely to locate near others of their type, such as the diamond district on 47th Street in New York City, or the clusters of used car lots found in most small cities (Quigley 1998) . This led economists to hypothesize that when certain types of fi rms were located in proximity to each other, they all received value from the fact of agglomeration that was independent of any single fi rm's contribution. Since then, a great deal of empirical work has confi rmed the existence of localized agglomeration economies that play a powerful role in the locational choices of fi rms (Drennan 1999 , Glaser 1998 . One well-known example is AnnaLee Saxenian's description of the dramatic eff ects of agglomeration in the Silicon Valley computer industry (Saxenian 1994) . The clusters of biotechnology fi rms around Princeton, New Jersey, of banking and fi nancial fi rms in New York City, and computer hardware manufacturing fi rms around Austin, Texas are other examples of successful localized agglomeration economies. When locational choices of fi rms are infl uenced by the prospects of valuable agglomeration eff ects, those fi rms will be less likely to move overseas, or across the country, to escape rising labor costs. Indeed, many of the measures for which geographic unions might mobilize are measures which could enhance the value of the region's human capital, and thus increase the value of agglomeration. For example, corporate contributions to adult education and training programs make a locality's workforce more fl exible and skilled, thereby providing a benefi t to all area employers. Yet no individual employer has an incentive to establish such programs unilaterally because it would have no means of capturing all the benefi ts and ensuring that the benefi ts were not captured by a competitor. If a union induces all area-wide fi rms to contribute jointly, then all local fi rms share in the benefi t. Similarly, if enough corporations contribute to a local school system to raise the level of education attainment, that would help attract a high skilled workforce. In this way, the prospects of agglomeration economies combined with corporations' increased reliance on human capital could provide the glue to keep corporations in place and prevent them from bolting each time a citizen union demands that local fi rms adopt good corporate citizenship behavior.
D Broadening the labor and employment law fi eld
The fi eld of labor and employment has until now been seen as narrowly related to issues that arise in the employer-employee relationship in the workplace. However, given today's fl uid and boundaryless workplace, issues concerning work and of concern to workers do not always involve their relationships to their immediate employer. Rather, issues concerning the employment relationship implicate many other areas of law, such as health insurance, training and education, welfare assistance, pensions and social security. Also, there are new issues that have arisen for workers in their capacity as workers as a result of the new employment practices.
One legal issue that was invisible in the past but has become prominent today is the issue of who owns an employee's human capital. Because the new employment relationship relies on employees' intellectual, imaginative, and cognitive contribution to the fi rm, employers put a premium on human capital development and knowledge-sharing within the fi rm. Yet the frequent lateral movement between fi rms that typifi es the new relationship means that when an employee leaves one employer and goes to work for a competitor, there is a danger that proprietary knowledge will go too. Increasingly, the original employer, fearing that valuable knowledge possessed by the employee will fall into the hands of a competitor, will seek to prevent the employee from taking the job or utilizing the valuable knowledge. Yet employees understand that their employability depends upon their knowledge and skills and hence they assume that they can take their human capital with them as they move within the boundaryless workplace. As a result of these confl icting perspectives, legal disputes about employees' use of intellectual property in the post-termination setting have increased exponentially. It is probably now the most frequently litigated issue in the employment area.
The law of post-employment restraints -covenants not to compete and trade secret law -has always been complex and untidy. The area is a primal soup, mixing considerations, including employees' interests in job mobility, employers' interests in protecting business secrets, the public interest in a free labor market, and courts' interests in enforcing contracts. In the past ten years, 44 states have passed statutes to change their laws on postemployment restraints in ways that are more restrictive of employees and favor employers. In addition, many courts have adopted new approaches that have expanded the criteria under which covenants will be enforced, and have expanded their defi nition of trade secrets to give employers more protection. Some of these new criteria and doctrines are in direct confl ict with the terms and implicit understandings of the new employment relationship. For example, many courts now say that it is legitimate for employers to impose covenants to protect customer contact and employer investment in employee training. However, the new employment relationship promises to give employees networking opportunities and training for their own future employability. In this area, judicial interpretation is occurring without a proper understanding of the changes in the employment relationship. It is therefore necessary to develop a framework for deciding disputes involving the ownership of human capital in a fashion that protects the individual employee's control of her own knowledge and hence her ability to exert individual power in the labor market.
E Creating a new type of safety net such as workplace sabbatical/social
drawing rights In the future, it will be important to create a new type of social safety net, one tailored to the vulnerabilities of the workplace of today. Because most workers today will experience discontinuities in their labor market experiences, they need a way to provide for gaps and transitions. This will require portable health benefi ts, lifetime training and retraining opportunities, universal and adequate old-age assistance, and other forms of assistance for individuals who are in periods of transition between jobs or changing careers. To date, neither our welfare laws nor our labor and employment laws have focused on the problem of transition assistance. However, the issue has been actively considered in Europe. In 1999, a group of distinguished labor relations experts was convened by the European Commission to consider the implications of the changing nature of work. The group, chaired by Alain Supiot, was charged with considering the impact of changes in the workplace on labor regulation in Europe and to devise proposals for reform. In 2000, the group issued a report, known as the Supiot Report. The Report describes a changing employment landscape in Europe that mirrors changes that have occurred in the United States -a movement away from internal labor markets toward more fl exible industrial relations practices. The authors found that the new work practices have entailed a loss of job and income security for European workers. The Report called for new mechanisms to provide workers with mechanisms that equip individuals to move from one job to another (Supiot et al. 2001) .
The Supiot Report contained a number of suggestions for changes in the institutions regulating work to provide what they term 'active security'. Their most visionary proposal was for the creation of 'social drawing rights' to facilitate worker mobility and to enable workers to weather transitions. Under the proposal, an individual would accumulate social drawing rights on the basis of time spent at work. The drawing rights could be used for paid leave for purposes of obtaining training, working in the family sphere, or performing charitable or public service work. It would be a right that the individual could invoke on an optional basis to navigate career transitions, thereby giving fl exibility and security in an era of uncertainty. As Supiot writes, 'They are drawing rights as they can be brought into eff ect on two conditions: establishment of suffi cient reserve and the decision of the holder to make use of that reserve. They are social drawing rights as they are social both in the way they are established . . . and in their aims (social usefulness)' (Supiot et al. 2001) .
The concept of social drawing rights is related to existing arrangements in which workers have rights to time off from work for specifi ed purposes, such as union representation, maternity leave, and so forth. The Supiot Report makes an analogy to sabbatical leave, maternity leave, time off for union representatives and training vouchers to observe that 'we are surely witnessing here the emergence of a new type of social right, related to work in general' (Supiot et al. 2001) . Social drawing rights, the Report contends, would smooth these transitions and give individuals the resources to retool and to weather the unpredictable cycles of today's workplace.
In the United States, there are ample precedents for the concept of paid time off with re-employment rights to facilitate career transitions or life emergencies. There are well-established policies for paid leave for military service, jury duty, union business, and other socially valuable activities. Some occupations also off er periodic sabbatical leaves. The concept is also built into the idea of temporary disability in state workers' compensation and other insurance programs, which provide compensation and guarantee re-employment after temporary absences. The Family and Medical Leave Act extends the concept of leave time to parenting obligations, although it does not mandate that such leave time be compensated. These programs all refl ect and acknowledge the importance of subsidized time away from the workplace to facilitate a greater contribution to the workplace. They could serve as the basis for developing a more generalized concept of career transition leave, or to use more familiar parlance, a workplace sabbatical.
A workplace sabbatical would be a right, accrued by time spent in the labor force, to paid leave for the purpose of retooling, retraining, and repositioning oneself in the labor market. This right should be made a part of the contract of employment similar to a right to unemployment compensation. The workplace sabbatical right should not be an implied-in-fact term of the contract of employment -that is, it should not depend upon an employer implicitly promising employability, training and networking opportunities, and it should not be a right that can be disclaimed or waived. Rather, the right to a workplace sabbatical should be an implied-in-law term that grows out of the recognition that workers today are vulnerable to changing technological demands and need opportunities to change and develop their human capital as they face a lifetime of job transitions. The justifi cation for imposing such a term is that it tracks the normative as well as practical reality of today's workplace.
Conclusion
The workplace is changing and the labor and employment laws will change as well. Workers today are forced to bear many new risks in the labor market -risks of job loss, of wage variability, of benefi t gaps, of skill obsolescence, and of intermittent prolonged periods of unemployment. Currently our labor and employment laws do not address these problems, either for regular workers or for atypical workers. The changing nature of work has rendered much of the legal framework obsolete, and a new framework will be created to take its place. It remains to be seen whether the new framework will be a free market framework of laissez-faire capitalism, or
